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APPEARANCE MATTERS: A PROPOSAL TO PROHIBIT
APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
Elizabeth M. Adamitis
Abstract: The consideration of appearance in employment decisionmaking context is
prevalent and widely accepted. Nonetheless, statutory protection against such discrimination
remains limited. Federal protection applies only to claims related to already-protected
categories of discrimination, including disability, race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
and age. Only one state and a small number of cities and counties explicitly prohibit
appearance discrimination in employment. This Comment argues that consideration of
appearance in employment decisions is not justified, rational, or beneficial to society unless a
bona fide occupational qualification or reasonable business purpose exists. States should
adopt statutory protection for appearance to.protect otherwise qualified applicants and
employees from arbitrary and harmful discrimination. This protection will promote the
practice of hiring and retaining employees based solely on relevant qualifications and criteria.
It also will assist in repairing the inequities that result from the legitimizing of appearance
discrimination in employment, as well as in society as a whole.
"An individual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and
nourish his personality and may well be used as a means of
expressing his attitude and lifestyle."'
One survey of interviewers found appearance to be the single most
important factor in employee selection for a wide variety of jobs.2 A
study found that attractive attorneys earned more than their less attractive
classmates after five years of practice, a gap that increased after fifteen
years of practice.3 Society considers an attractive appearance to be a
highly valued commodity. Indeed, good looks may translate into a better
education, better job, bigger income, and generally a happier life.
Appearance is widely accepted as a legitimate consideration in
employment matters. However, for most jobs appearance has no bearing
on an individual's ability to perform. Further, the focus on appearance
serves to perpetuate and foster harmful societal inequities. Protection
from appearance discrimination is extremely limited, with most remedies
1. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,250-51 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2035, 2040 (1987) (citing R Gatewood et al.,
Effects of Training on the Selection Interview 17 (1985)).
3. See Jeff E. Biddle & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: Lawyers'
Looks and Lucre, 16 . Lab. Econ. 172, 185-90 (1998). "The evidence strongly suggests that beauty
is not merely correlated with but actually causes differences in earnings." Id. at 197.
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restricted to suits implicating already-protected categories, such as
disability, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age.4 Only
Michigan5 and a limited number of cities and counties6 directly protect
their citizens from varying types of appearance discrimination.
This Comment argues that states should add protection for appearance
to their employment discrimination laws. Appearance discrimination is
pervasive and harmful and has not been meaningfully curtailed by
existing laws. States should protect applicants and employees from
discrimination based on physical characteristics, and based on grooming
and attire associated with disability, race, color, religion, sex, ethnicity,
age, or of some other cultural or historical significance. Part I of this
Comment discusses the existence and effect of appearance discrimination
in employment. Part II explores currently available legal remedies for
appearance-discrimination victims. Part III outlines the justification for
protecting victims of appearance discrimination and describes the
shortcomings and inapplicability of existing remedies. Finally, Part IV
proposes a statutory framework for protecting appearance through state
employment-discrimination laws and anticipates and responds to
possible criticisms of such protection.
I. PREVALENCE OF APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
A. The Role of Beauty in Society
Our society places an undeniable emphasis on the value of physical
beauty.' Despite popular belief to the contrary, evidence shows wide
uniformity in people's perceptions of what constitutes beauty or
4. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (age);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (disability); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1994) (race); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (race); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (race, color, religion, sex, national origin);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994) (disability); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.60.180 (1998) (Washington's law against discrimination) (age, sex, race, creed, color, national
origin, disability).
5. See Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2202 (West 1999).
6. See, e.g., Santa Cruz Prohibition Against Discrimination, Santa Cruz, Cal., Code § 9.83 (1995);
D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2512 (1981); Jane ByeffKom, Fat, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 25, 28 n.17 (1997) (noting
cities and counties prohibiting physical appearance-discrimination, including Urbana, Illinois;
Madison, Wisconsin; and Howard County, Maryland).
7. See generally Meg Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast?, 4 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 221 (1994).
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attractiveness! We commonly associate physical traits with perceived
correlating qualities or characteristics.9 Attractiveness corresponds with
attributes such as virtue, integrity, intelligence, sensitivity, kindness, and
honesty," whereas excess weight or obesity corresponds with
perceptions of laziness, lack of discipline, incompetence, lack of
productivity, and slovenliness." This attribution process is both legal and
socially acceptable.'2 Its existence in early childhood and its extension
into virtually every facet of and relationship in our adult lives exemplify
its pervasiveness. 3
B. Appearance Discrimination in Employment
Appearance discrimination in employment is likewise ubiquitous. 4
Employers use appearance traits as indicators of employee worth or
qualification. 5 In fact, from an economic perspective, some argue
appearance is a valid indicator of productivity, to the extent that produc-
8. See Gordon L. Patzer, The Physical Attractiveness Phenomena 15-17 (1985); see also Nancy
Etcof& Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty 137-39 (1999) (citing studies reflecting
cultural and cross-cultural agreement on beauty); Gehrke, supra note 7, at 229-30 (noting different
cultural preferences in regard to height, weight, and features, but "basic principles of beauty-
namely, symmetry, balance and wholeness of form" consistent across cultures). Perceptions of
beauty may even be innate. See Etcoff, supra, at 31-32 (describing study in which three- to six-
month-old babies were shown slides of faces rated for attractiveness and stared significantly longer
at faces deemed attractive regardless of sex, age, or race of individuals pictured).
9. See David L. Wiley, Comment, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in
American Criminal Trials, 27 St. Mary's LJ. 193,201-03 & nn.31-39 (1995) (describing process of
drawing inferences based on appearance and citing studies finding association of positive
characteristics with attractiveness and negative characteristics with unattractiveness).
10. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 8; Gehrke, supra note 7, at 230-32.
11. See Esther D. Rothblum et al., The Relationship Between Obesity, Employment Discrimination,
and Employment-Related Victimization, 37 J. vocational Behav. 251,252-53 (1990).
12. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that although public reaction to differential treatment
based on attractiveness typically takes form of indifference, disagreement, or anger, the practice is
widespread and extensively documented).
13. See id at 9 (citing studies on infants, children, middle-aged, and elderly); Wiley, supra note 9,
at 207-11 (citing studies on children, teachers, educational administrators, employers, doctors,
constituents, lawyers, and juries showing preferences based on attractiveness).
14. Discrimination based on attractiveness may be more prevalent than discrimination based on
race, sex, or religion. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 11; see also Note, supra note 2, at 2041 (citing
study concluding it may be easier for thin African-American to find employment than overweight
Caucasian).
15. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 1.
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tivity is measured by personal, customer, or coworker satisfaction. 6
Aside from characteristics already proscribed for consideration, employ-
ers generally retain discretion to consider whatever factors they deem
important in their employment decisions. 7 Employers routinely
acknowledge the importance of an attractive appearance in employee
selection. 8 Given the immediate visibility of physical attributes,
grooming, and attire, appearance often constitutes an employer's first
impression of an applicant's employability. 19
The results of numerous studies and surveys reflect the reality of
appearance discrimination in employment. One study concluded that
"plain" people earned five to ten percent less than "average-looking"
people, who in turn earned five percent less than "good-looking"
people.2 Another study found an eight- to twenty-percent increase in
salary offers to applicants perceived as being more attractive.' Forty
percent of males and sixty percent of females considered overweight
reported past incidences of employment discrimination because of their
weight.2 A study found that overweight females had incomes averaging
$6710 less than non-overweight females, while short men had incomes
averaging $3037 less than men of average height.23
16. See Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, Bus. Wk., Mar. 16,
1998, at 18. But see infra note 69.
17. See 1 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 197 (3d ed. 1996).
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Wiley, supra note 9, at 209 n.60.
19. See generally Patzer, supra note 8, at 1. "[A] good deal of control over appearance is
exercised at the hiring stage ... [particularly] with respect to appearance characteristics that the
employer assumes the applicant would not be able to change .. " Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls
Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2551 (1994). Evidence suggests that most employment is obtained through
direct contact with employers. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, 37 Employment & Earnings 34
(Gloria Peterson Green & Rosalie K. Epstein eds., Jan. 1990).
20. See Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, Am. Econ. Rev.,
Dec. 1994, at 1174, 1186.
21. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 109 (citing study).
22. See Christopher J. Martin, Protecting Overweight Workers Against Discrimination: Is
Disability or Appearance the Real Issue?, 20 Employee Rel. L.J. 133, 134 (1994) (citing study). See
also infra note 42 for definitions of overweight and obesity.
23. See Stephen L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight in
Adolescence and Young Adulthood, New Eng. J. Med., Sept. 30, 1993, at 1008, 1010-11; see also
James D. Sargent & David. G. Blanchflower, Obesity and Stature in Adolescence and Earnings in
Young Adulthood, Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Med., July 1994, at 681, 683-84 (finding 10-
centimeter increase in height raised males' earnings by 2.7% and females' earnings by 2%).
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The legitimizing of appearance discrimination adversely impacts
employment and society as a whole. Employers are free to use criteria
not indicative of or correlated with satisfactory job performance.
Appearance discrimination in employment validates appearance traits
deemed socially acceptable and desirable and adversely impacts
individuals who fall short of these standards. Appearance discrimination
rests on stereotypical notions about particular appearances24 and,
especially for women, can result in preoccupation with appearance and
associated disorders.' The impact of such discrimination is particularly
relevant with respect to weight, given that overweight and obese
individuals constitute between one-third and one-half of the U.S.
population.26 Appearance discrimination in employment is, thus, both
common and harmful.
II. EXISTING LEGAL REMEDIES FOR APPEARANCE
DISCRIMINATION
Recourse for appearance discrimination is limited. Unless a person
resides within one of the few jurisdictions explicitly prohibiting appear-
ance discrimination," victims must be able to tie their appearance claims
to an already-protected category. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),28 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII),29 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), ° which together prohibit
discrimination based on disability, race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, and age, are the most important federal employment
discrimination laws." States, counties, and cities also protect their
citizens from these and other types of discrimination.32 Discrimination
24. See supra Part LA.
25. See infra notes 87, 147-52, and accompanying text.
26. See Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and Legal Argument for
Including Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol'y 563,563-64 n.5 (1996); Are We Really Getting Fatter?, Bus. & Health, July 1998, at 12.
27. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
31. Claims may also arise under other federal laws, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (prohibiting disability discrimination by institutions receiving federal aid); the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (prohibiting racial discrimination); and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (prohibiting racial discrimination).
32. State statutes typically mirror their federal counterparts. But see infra note 53.
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claims generally involve either disparate treatment, where an employer
intentionally treats an individual in a protected category differently than
others,33 or disparate impact, where some otherwise neutral pattern or
practice adversely impacts members of a protected category. 4
A. Appearance-Related Disability Discrimination Under the ADA
When an appearance trait constitutes a disabling condition, the ADA
may 5 provide relief.36 The ADA prohibits discrimination against
"qualified" disabled individuals, which the statute defines to include
those who can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable
accommodation.37 To be disabled under the ADA, an individual must be
substantially limited in a major life activity by a physical or mental
impairment,38 have a record of such an impairment,39 or be perceived as
33. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 17, at 9.
34. See id at 81-83 (noting that courts are split as to application of disparate impact under ADEA).
35. Employers may dispute an individual's inclusion within the ADA; proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(a) (1998); show that
challenged selection criteria are job related and consistent with business necessity, and that
performance could not be accomplished with reasonable accommodation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)
(1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15()(l)-(c) (1998); or show that required accommodation would impose
an undue hardship, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1998).
36. Given the ADA's wide application to private employers with fifteen or more employees, see
42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (1994), this Comment focuses on the ADA instead of the Rehabilitation
Act to discuss the available federal coverage for appearance-related claims through the filing of a
disability discrimination claim. See supra note 31. Given the similarity between the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, case law interpreting one statute is used in interpreting the other. See, e.g.,
Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)-(o) (1998).
38. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Title I of the ADA, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994), and has authority to issue regulations and offer technical assistance
on the subchapters for which they are responsible. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12206(c)(1) (1994). But
see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145-46 (1999) (holding that no agency has
been given authority over generally applicable ADA provisions, including meaning of "disability,"
but declining to consider deference due to regulations and interpretative guidance in this respect).
The EEOC defines the relevant "disability" terms as follows:
Substantially limits.., means ... [u]nable to perform ... or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a ... major life activity as
compared to the.., average person in the general population.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
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impaired. 4 For example, an individual not hired as a sales representative
because of the perception that a facial disfigurement will dissuade
customers may find recourse under the ADA if perceived as impaired in
the major life activity of working.4
Most appearance-related disability claims under the ADA thus far
have considered whether an overweight or obese 2 individual is
"disabled."43 An ADA "impairment" does not include ordinary physical
characteristics, height, weight, or muscle tone within "normal" range and
not resulting from an underlying physiological condition." An extreme
deviation in height or weight or one resulting from an underlying
Physical... impairment means... any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiosvascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998). The EEOC has also issued interpretative guidance and a compliance
manual. These documents do not command the degree of deference owed the regulations. See
Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
39. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(k) (1998) (defining as having "a history of, or ha[ving] been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities").
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(/) (1998) (including impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activity but is treated as such; substantially limiting impairment solely as result of others'
attitudes; or no impairment, but treatment as though there was substantially limiting impairment); see
also Sution, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-52.
41. See, e.g., Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1131-32 (Vt 1992) (finding
chambermaid lacking upper teeth regarded as substantially limited in working under state law
because she was perceived to be unfit to be seen by guests); EEOC, Definition of the Term
"Disability," reprinted in Disability Discrimination § 902.8(d), at 902-48 (1998) (new section to
EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. 2 (Mar. 1995)) (giving example of prominent facial scar). A
substantial limitation in working requires a significant restriction in performing "either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs.., as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities" as opposed to a "single, particularjob." 29 C.F.RL § 1630 (j)(3) (1998); see also
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
42. Obesity is defined generally as a weight thirty percent or more over the norm for one's height.
The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 58 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 17th ed. 1999). In this
Comment, "overweight" will refer generally to a weight over the norm for a person's height.
43. See Gregory B. Reilly, Employees"'Personal Appearance, 11 Lab. Law. 261,268-69 (1995).
44. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998) (giving examples of eye color, hair color, or left-
handedness as ordinary physical characteristics). The Supreme Court recently noted that the ADA
allows employers to prefer certain physical attributes, including height or build, and establish
physical criteria, so long as they do not make decisions based on real or imagined substantially
limiting impairments. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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disorder may constitute an impairment,45 but obesity qualifies only in
rare circumstances.46 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has noted that severe obesity qualifies as an impairment and that
an obese individual suffering from an underlying or resultant
physiological disorder, such as hypertension or a thyroid condition, is
similarly impaired.47 Such individuals would still have to show, however,
that the obesity substantially limited, had a record of substantially
limiting, or was regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.48
Courts entertaining ADA obesity-discrimination claims have taken
different approaches and reached different conclusions.49 In Cook v.
Rhode Island,5" the First Circuit concluded that an applicant's morbid
obesity was a disabling impairment5' and that the employer regarded her
as substantially limited in working in a broad range of jobs. 2 However,
in the majority of reported cases, 53 courts have declined to find obesity a
disability, particularly in the absence of any associated physiological
condition. 4 In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court
45. See EEOC, supra note 41, § 902.2(c)(5), at 902-11. Compare Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp.
1418, 1425 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding four-foot-five-inch-tall man with achondroplastic dwarfism
impaired under ADA), with American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350
N.W.2d 120, 121 (Wis. 1984) (concluding four-foot-ten-inch-tall stature not result of underlying
condition, not impairment under state law).
46. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
47. See EEOC, supra note 41, § 902.2(c)(5)(ii), at 902-12.
48. See id. at 902-13 n.16.
49. See Kom, supra note 6, at 40-68.
50. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
51. See id. at 23.
52. See id. at 26.
53. Many cases involve state laws that vary in their definitions of disability. For example,
Washington's law against discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998), protects individuals
disabled by a "sensory, mental, or physical condition if... discriminated against because of the
condition and the condition is abnormal." Wash. Admin. Code § 162-22-040(1)(a) (1999) (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash. 2d 8, 17-18, 846 P.2d 531, 536 (1993); see also
infra note 57 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that because
disability had not been defined, it would be construed in its ordinary sense to mean either a condition
that hindered, impeded, or incapacitated, or a disadvantage making achievement unusually difficult,
particularly where it limited a capacity to work. See Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415
N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987) (finding 300-pound woman not disabled because her weight was not
disability and there was no underlying physical condition). Other state laws fail to cover perceived
disabilities or appear to exclude individuals mistakenly perceived as disabled. See Michael D.
Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some Reflections on the Interpretation of Disability
Discrimination Statutes, 13 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 345, 347-48 (1996).
54. See Kom, supra note 6, at 40 & n.107. Compare Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281, 283-84 (Pa. 1991) (holding obesity was not handicap under
202
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of California held a plaintiff's severe obesity was not a disability because
it did not result from a physiological condition or disorder. 6 In Greene v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co.,5' a federal district court found that an
individual's morbid obesity was not a disability under Washington state
law because his condition was mutable. 8 In Smaw v. Virginia
Department of State Police,59 a federal district court held that an obese
employee who was demoted failed to prove a substantial limitation in
working or a perception of a disability.' In general, while overweight-to-
moderately-obese individuals will not be found impaired unless they are
perceived as disabled,61 severely obese individuals or individuals
overweight or obese from an underlying physiological disorder might
succeed in a claim under the ADA.
62
B. Appearance-Related Discrimination Under Title VII and the ADEA
Appearance-discrimination claims also may constitute discrimination
based on protected categories under Title VII or the ADEA. Taken
together, these statutes protect individuals from discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age.63 In addition to
physical characteristics, these claims may involve grooming or attire.
The success of an appearance discrimination claim implicating one or
more of these protected categories will depend upon the circumstances
and the availability of a defense. Courts will generally attempt to balance
Pennsylvania law if it was not physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting major body system), with State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 698
(N.Y. 1991) (determining that clinically diagnosed obesity was impairment under New York law).
55. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993).
56. See id. at 1153.
57. 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
58. See id. at 5.
59. 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994).
60. See id. at 1475.
61. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that physical
characteristics not resulting from physiological disorders are not disabling impairments; finding
firefighter failed to allege he had disabling impairment as defined under act and that employer
believed weight condition constituted disabling impairment); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding flight attendant who exceeded weight guidelines due to
body building not impaired, given that she was only excluded from single job, her condition was
voluntary, and it did not stem from underlying condition).
62. See, e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
63. See supra note 4.
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the applicant or employee's interests against the interests of the
employer.' With grooming or attire cases, deference may be given to
employers' managerial discretion and to attempts to minimize the
burdens or barriers imposed on employees.65  With intentional
discrimination based on religion, sex, national origin, and age, an
employer may assert a "bona fide occupational qualification" (bfoq)
reasonably necessary to the normal operations of employers' business."
An employer may demonstrate an inability to provide reasonable
accommodation for a religious observance or practice without undue
hardship.67 With disparate impact claims based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, employers may prove that the challenged policy
or practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.68 As a
general rule, however, employers may not justify their appearance-
related objections based on customer preference.69
1. Appearance Attributes Associated with Race, Color, Religion, and
National Origin
Discrimination based on physical characteristics, grooming, or attire,
associated with race, color, religion, or national origin may be actionable
under Title VII.70 The viability of claims based on immutable appearance
attributes depends on an employer's ability to establish a reasonable-
64. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 263.
65. This is particularly true with sex discrimination. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing:
Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1395, 1418-19 (1992); Reilly, supra
note 43, at 267-68.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994). There is generally no bfoq for
race or color. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 17, at 350. The bfoq defense is both narrowly
written and construed. See id. at 382, 394, 616; see also Western Air Lines Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 412-14 (1985) (finding bfoq must be reasonably necessary to business and employer compelled
to rely on it as proxy); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting bfoq applicable only where within "essence" of business or when essence would be
undermined in its absence).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
69. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 263 n.8; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2) (1998)
(providing no bfoq based on preference of coworkers, employer, clients, or customers; for
authenticity or genuineness will consider sex bfoq); Gerdom v. Continental Airlines Inc., 692 F.2d
602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting gender discrimination based on customer preferences unrelated to
job performance cannot be upheld and invalidating policy requiring only female flight attendants to
comply with weight parameters); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir.
1981) (denying gender as bfoq for position requiring work with international clientele).
70. See generally Kare, supra note 65; Reilly, supra note 43.
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business-necessity defense.7 A number of cases involve psuedo-
follicullitis barbae (PFB), which inhibits face shaving and dispro-
portionately affects African-Americans.72 In Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta,73 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a no-beard policy as applied to
firefighters suffering from PFB because facial hair interfered with
respirators and thus imperiled the firefighters' health and safety.74
Conversely, in Bradley v. Pizzaco, Inc.,75 the Eighth Circuit rejected an
employer's argument that its no-beard policy bolstered pizza delivery
sales. 76 Disparate treatment claims based on skin color77 and height or
weight requirements adversely impacting certain nationalities may also
be successful.
78
Claims based on mutable appearance characteristics have met with
mixed success. Courts have denied claims of African-American women
with beaded and/or braided hair,79 as well as claims filed by Sikhs, whose
religious beliefs prohibit the cutting of their hair."0 In Rogers v. American
71. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 17, at 343-44.
72. Although relatively uncommon among Caucasians, PFB affects approximately 25% of
African-American males. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 264.
73. 2 F.3d 1112 (1Ith Cir. 1993).
74. See id. at 1120-21. The employees failed to show that "shadow" beards would have satisfied
health and safety standards. See id at 1122-23.
75. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
76. See id at 799. But see Woods v. Safeway Stores, In=, 420 F. Supp. 35, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(finding no-beard policy justified as business necessity based on customer preference for grocery
store hygiene and cleanliness).
77. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 17, at 343. But see Sere v. Board of Trustees, 628 F.
Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. II!. 1986) (noting intra-racial suits not actionable under § 198 1).
78. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 17, at 380. See also, e.g., Craig v. County of Los
Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding minimum-height requirement unlawful due to
discriminatory effect on Mexican-Americans).
79. See McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1758, 1759-60 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (holding refusal of staffing agency to place women with braided hair not actionable because it
was not illegal under Title VII and plaintiff's belief rule was racially biased was not reasonable);
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698, 699-700 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(finding no evidence that rule against coruows had disparate impact or that grooming standards
were arbitrarily applied); Rogers v. American Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that ban on "comrow" style hair (beaded and braided) was
discriminatory).
80. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissing claim
because defendant required all employees to shave facial hair and made efforts to accommodate);
EEOC v. Sambo's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding denial of promotion due to
refusal to shave facial hair based on valid business necessity of sanitation and "clean-cut image").
But see Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 926 (D.C.NJ. 1999) (finding prima facie
case of religious bias where Muslim was terminated for not shaving beard).
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Airlines,8 the plaintiff asserted that braided hair was historically and
culturally valuable to African-American women.8" The court dismissed
the claim based on its determination that the policy applied to both
genders and all races, did not regulate immutable characteristics, and was
of relatively negligible importance." However, an early decision found a
policy prohibiting "bushy" hair racially discriminatory based on its
adverse impact on African-Americans, given the relationship between
hair texture and the "afro" hairstyle, as well as its racially symbolic
importance. 84
2. Appearance Attributes Associated with Sex and Age
Appearance-related claims also may implicate discrimination based on
sex, age, or both." In fact, the largest number of appearance-related
claims appear to involve sex or gender in some respect.8 6 The
consideration of appearance in this context also may impact women
disproportionately. Although many age-discrimination complaints are
81. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
82. See id. at 231-32.
83. See id.
84. EEOC Decision No. 71-2444, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18, 19 (1971); cf Keys v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 357 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (dismissing claim
where plaintiff alleged that facial hair was symbol of black pride); see also EEOC Decision No.
7090, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 236, 236-37 (1969) (finding reasonable cause that employer
discriminated against black applicant based on distinctive racial feature (large lips)). Claims alleging
religious discrimination based on grooming or attire may be similarly actionable. See, e.g., Calloway
v. Gimbel Bros., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 707-09 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (denying dismissal
where employer refused to assign work to black Muslim employee wearing religious skull cap); cf
McGlothin v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist, 829 F. Supp. 853, 866 (S.D. Miss. 1992)
(dismissing discrimination claims based on religion when teacher terminated for "African-style
headwraps" and uncoftibed hair, when plaintiff failed to show employer had knowledge of religious
foundation for practices, and plaintiff instead expressed that practices were based on African culture
and heritage).
85. See Wiley, supra note 9, at 218 n.87 (citing comparisons made between appearance, sex, and
age discrimination).
86. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 266; see also Klare, supra note 65, at 1414 (suggesting gender-
based grooming regulations most frequently litigated appearance issues).
87. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2564-65 (describing heightened standards used to
evaluate female appearance); Kor, supra note 6, at 29-36 (discussing equation of thinness with
beauty and disproportionate effects on women); Wiley, supra note 9, at 216-18 (noting women are
more likely than men to encounter-physical appearance discrimination in society, employment, and
judicial system). See generally Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used
Against Women (1991) (describing deleterious effects of obsession with beauty on women). See also
infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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not based on appearance per se, they may implicitly involve an
applicant's or employee's "old" or "older" appearance and the
stereotypical assumptions derived from that visual perception. Further,
for women in particular, age and beauty often may be intertwined in an
appearance-related discrimination claim.88
Physical-attribute requirements or criteria exclusively applying to or
adversely impacting one sex may be found unlawful. In the absence of a
legitimate defense, height and weight requirements may constitute
disparate treatment or result in a disparate impact based on sex.
Therefore, minimum height and weight requirements not job related and
having a disparate impact on women seeking jobs as prison guards have
been found unlawful,89 as have maximum-weight requirements imposed
solely on female flight attendants in an attempt to increase sales by
having "attractive" attendants.' However, courts have upheld differential
weight requirements for male and female flight attendants based on the
idea that weight was a matter of personal appearance, subject to an
individual's own control, and not a fundamental aspect of life.9"
Grooming and attire regulations may constitute illegal discrimination
where they impose different standards based on gender,92 reflect gender-
based stereotypes,93 or expose employees to sexual harassment.94 In
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,95 the Seventh Circuit
found disparate treatment based on sex where an employer required
women to wear a uniform but men to wear only "customary" business
attire.96 In EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.,97 a district court concluded that
88. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
89. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977).
90. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1982).
91. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1042,
1045 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
92. See, e.g., Department of Civil Rights v. Edward W. Sparrow Hosp. Ass'n, 377 N.W.2d 755,
764 (Mich. 1985) (finding uniform requirement for females only violated state law); infra note 96
and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D.
Ohio 1987) (holding requirement that only females must wear smock was result of sexual
stereotype); infra note 98 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., infra note 98 and accompanying text. But see EEOC Decision No. 85-9, 37 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1893, 1895-96 (1985) (dismissing charge where female employees required
to wear swimsuits to work).
95. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
96. See id. at 1029, 1032-33.
97. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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forcing female employees to wear a revealing uniform both exposed
women to sexual harassment and promoted the stereotype of women as
objects of sexual exploitation.98 However, where grooming and attire
policies apply to both sexes, they may distinguish between the sexes
based on generally accepted social norms or standards. 9 For example,
men alone may be required to keep their hair short," and women alone
may be required, or permitted, to wear skirts.''
Discrimination claims based on sex, age, or a combination of the two
also may result from an employer's preference for attractive or youthful
appearances.0 2 These issues have been particularly relevant for women
working in the airline industry' 3 and broadcast joumalism. " Where only
women are hired to promote a sexually appealing image, but without a
bfoq,10 5 or where gender-based stereotypes are reflected,0 6 these types of
claims may succeed. Generally, however, employers may freely impose
98. See id. at 607-08.
99. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975)
(upholding sex-based differential hair-length regulations); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333,
1334, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding no sex discrimination in distinct male and female hair
regulations).
100. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387-90 (1th Cir.
1998), cen. denied, 119 S. Ct. 509 (1998).
101. See, e.g., Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
102. Title VII recognizes a "sex plus" theory, wherein a subclass is discriminated against based
on sex plus another characteristic. These cases are typically more successful where the "plus" is an
immutable characteristic; a fundamental right; or a characteristic significantly affecting the
opportunities and terms or conditions of employment afforded one sex. See Lindemann & Grossman,
supra note 17, at 457. The most common plus factors are marriage, family, race, and appearance. See
id. at 458. Federal district courts, but no federal appellate courts, have addressed "sex-plus-age"
under Title VII. See Sabina F. Crocette, Comment, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination
Claims by Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis-A Pragmatic Model, 28
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 115, 140-44 (1998). There has not yet been recognition of an "age plus"
theory under the ADEA. See id. at 149.
103. Early cases struck down female-only flight attendant policies based on alleged customer
preference and sex appeal as a job requirement. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292, 303-04 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding airline failed to show that feminine sex appeal was
legitimate job requirement for flight attendants and ticket agents, and striking female-only hiring
policy).
104. See generally Joanne Bal, Comment, Proving Appearance-Related Sex Discrimination in
Television News: A Disparate Impact Theory, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F. 211; Patti Buchman, Note, Title
VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related
Appearance, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 190 (1985).
105. See supra note 103.
106. See supra notes 93, 98, and accompanying text.
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gender-neutral grooming standards including attractiveness components. °7
Yet even with supposedly gender-neutral application, females may
disproportionately fall victim to attractiveness-based grooming stand-
ards. 08 In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,' °9 the Eighth Circuit dismissed a sex
discrimination claim filed by a female television news anchor reassigned
after customer surveys ranked her lower than other female anchors based
on her dress and appearance, despite proffered evidence of differential
and stereotypical attractiveness requirements for men and women." °
Given the common correlation of beauty with youth, these types of
claims also disproportionately impact older females."' Finally, the
recognition of a bfoq within this context arguably provides the
opportunity for employers explicitly to require attractiveness or sexual
appeal in their female employees."'
C. State and Local Statutes Prohibiting Appearance Discrimination
Individuals may directly pursue appearance-discrimination claims in a
limited number of jurisdictions." 3 Michigan prohibits discrimination
based on height or weight" 4 The District of Columbia proscribes
discrimination based on "personal appearance," defined as: "the outward
appearance of any person, irrespective of sex, with regard to bodily
107. See Klare, supra note 65, at 1423-24.
108. See, e.g., Barlett, supra note 19, at 2553 (noting studies showing view of women's
competence and authority is often based in part on their outward appearance).
109. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
110. See id. at 1209, 1217. Females were instructed to wear "feminine touches," avoid excessive
aggressiveness or softness, more frequently change outfits, and were told to remember "professional
elegance," while male anchors were told to remember "professional image." Id. at 1214. The
plaintiff was assigned a "clothing calendar." Id at 1214. But see Mike Allen, Anchorwoman Wins
S8.3 Million Over Sex Bias, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1999, at BI (reporting $8.3 million judgment for
anchorwoman's sex and retaliation, but not age, discrimination claims).
11. Christine Craft alleged she was told "the audience perceived her as... too old, too
unattractive, and not deferential enough to men." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209.
112 Although all claims have been settled, Hooters Restaurant has asserted a gender bfoq for its
servers, arguing its "core marketing strategy [is] to sexually attract and titillate heterosexual males."
Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimination, 31 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 551, 569 (1998). Whether sex-appeal can in itself qualify as a bfoq is not entirely
clear. See id. at 558 (mentioning author could locate only two decisions validating, in dicta, women-
only hiring policy based on job requirement of sexual attractiveness; but noting subsequent decision
dismissing sex bfoq based on desire to increase sales with female servers in alluring costumes).
113. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for jurisdictions that have laws prohibiting
appearance discrimination.
114. See Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2202 (West 1999).
Washington Law Review
condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner or style
of personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and
beards." 5 A number of counties and cities protect their inhabitants from
different types of appearance discrimination. For example, Santa Cruz,
California, bars discrimination based on height, weight, or "physical
characteristics," defined as "a bodily condition or bodily characteristic of
any person which is from birth, accident or disease, or from any natural
physical development, or any event outside the control of that person
including individual physical mannerisms.'" 16
These laws provide employers with defenses for differential treatment
based on appearance. A bfoq or reasonable business necessity may be
established in Michigan." 7 The District of Columbia statute provides that
protection from personal-appearance discrimination does not apply to
cleanliness, uniforms, or prescribed standards, when uniformly
applied.., to a class of employees for a reasonable business
purpose; or when such bodily conditions or characteristics, style or
manner of dress or personal grooming presents a danger to the
health, welfare or safety of any individual." 8
Similarly, the Santa Cruz statute exempts physical-appearance discrimi-
nation with regard to "health, welfare or safety" concerns." 9
Michigan interprets and applies its appearance statute in a fashion
similar to existing employment discrimination laws. In Lamoria v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp.,20 a Michigan appellate court held
weight discrimination could be established where weight was a
determinative factor in an employment action.' The court found direct
evidence, including derisive comments, sufficient to permit the
conclusion that weight was a determinative factor in the termination.'
In contrast, the plaintiff in Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ' failed to show
weight discrimination where there was only one slur and no evidence
115. D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2512 (1981).
116. Santa Cruz Prohibition Against Discrimination, Santa Cruz, Cal., Code § 9.83 (1995).
117. See, e.g., Micu v. City of Warren, 382 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. 1985) (holding fire department
may not discriminate based on height without bfoq).
118. D.C. CodeAnn. § 1-2512.
119. Santa Cruz Prohibition Against Discrimination, Santa Cruz, Cal., Code § 9.83.
120. 584 N.W.2d 589 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
121. Seeid. at594.
122. See id. at 595.
123. 811 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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beyond speculation of a link between the harassment and weight. 24 The
statute has also resulted in the satisfactory settlement of a number of
claims and the consequent revision of discriminatory employment
policies and standards."~
The District of Columbia prohibition has resulted in a wide variety of
court decisions. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia
Commission on Human Rights,'26 an appellate court found personal-
appearance discrimination where an employee was criticized for her
allegedly provocative clothing, despite the fact that her clothing was
apparently similar to her coworkers' and there was no uniformly
prescribed standard of dress.'27 In Underwood v. Archer Management
Services, Inc.," a federal district court found an unlawful discharge
where an employee was terminated because she was a transsexual with
some masculine traits' 29
The D.C. Court of Appeals explored the defense of a "uniform
prescribed standard" with a "reasonable business purpose" in Turcios v.
United States Service Industries 3° The court held that an employer must
demonstrate the existence of the standard, its uniform application to a class
of employees, and a reasonable business purpose.'' A reasonable business
purpose need only show an objective, reasonable justification, and need not
rise to the level of a business necessity.' Outside of the small number of
jurisdictions in which appearance discrimination is prohibited, the
remedies currently available for appearance-discrimination victims are
insufficient to address this problem adequately.
124. See id. at 293.
125. See Patricia Harnett, Note, Nature or Nurture, Lifestyle or Fate: Employment Discrimination
Against Obese Workers, 24 Rutgers Li. 807, 838 n.169 (1993) (noting conciliation conferences
wherein employers settled and revised weight and height policies in conformance with state law).
126. 515 A.2d 1095 (D.C. 1986).
127. Seeid. at 1100.
128. 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
129. See id. at 98-99.
130. 680 A.2d 1023, 1027-29 (D.C. 1996) (holding hairstyle standard communicated general rule
of conformity to traditional grooming and ban on ponytails reasonable and foreseeable interpretation
and finding reasonable business purpose based on complaints and fear that ponytails would
jeopardize contract); cf Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847, 854-56 (D.C. 1995) (ruling
fire department failed to establish legitimate defense for prohibition on facial hair since rule was not
uniformly applied, was not safety based, was not essential aspect of uniform, and did not foster
esprit de corps). The regulations did contain a PFB exception. See id. at 854.
131. See Turcios, 680 A.2d at 1027.
132. See id. at 1028.
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III. VICTIMS OF APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE
PROTECTED FROM ITS HARMFUL, UNWARRANTED, AND
UNJUST EFFECTS
The establishment of state and local appearance-discrimination
employment statutes would benefit aggrieved individuals, employers,
and society as a whole. Employers would be encouraged to hire
applicants based solely on legitimate qualifications and business
concerns, instead of on stereotypical and unfounded assumptions.
Individuals who may be otherwise hampered or harmed by their
appearances would have a mechanism to fight back.
Most applicants and employees receive inadequate protection from
appearance discrimination. Although some appearance claims might fall
within the scope of Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, the vast majority
of appearance-discrimination claims are not actionable. Furthermore,
even where a connection to a protected category can be argued, many
claims likely will fail because they actually involve discrimination based
on appearance, as opposed to a characteristic related to the existing
category.
Appearance-discrimination victims should not be limited to existing
laws. Clearly, disabled individuals and those perceived as disabled
should utilize the ADA. Claims under Title VII and the ADEA should
similarly be pursued where appropriate and possible. However, an
avenue of relief should also exist for individuals who face and endure
real and damaging discrimination based on their outward appearance.
A. Appearance Discrimination Is a Pervasive and Harmful Problem
Warranting Statutory Protection
1. Appearance Discrimination Is Arbitrary, Irrational, and Unfair
Appearance discrimination is arbitrary, irrational, and unfair because
no correlation exists between appearance and performance for most
jobs.133 If the rhetoric of the anti-affirmative-action debate is to be
believed, hiring the most qualified individual for a job constitutes the
ideal for employee selection. Appearance does not relate to a job
133. But see Hamermesh & Biddle, supra note 20, at 1177 (noting theory that attractive
individuals may earn more and advance higher by being more productive and employers may benefit
by having attractive employees in positions involving customer or coworker interactions).
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qualification unless a bfoq or business necessity exists.'34 For example,
one study found that an employee's weight does not affect ninety percent
of work-related activities.3 5 Yet employers often equate excess weight or
obesity with attributes indicating a lack of fitness for employment.
1 6
Arguments supporting appearance discrimination to please custom-
ers'37 fail in the face of the general prohibition on using customer
preference as an excuse to discriminate.' Both the lack of a correlation
between appearance and job qualification and the harm resulting from
appearance discrimination detracts from this argument. Just as an
employer may not refuse to hire women or minorities because of some
perceived or even real customer preference, employers should not be
justified in denying qualified applicants employment because their
customers would prefer to interact with someone physically attractive.'39
2. Appearance Discrimination Derives from Prejudice and Its
Prohibition Would Further the Intent ofExisting Laws
Prohibiting appearance discrimination serves the larger societal goal
of protecting individuals subject to adverse treatment based on prejudices
and stereotypes. Antidiscrimination laws create legal mechanisms to
protect individuals from disadvantageous treatment based on member-
ship in a particular group."4° These laws thus combat the use of
prejudices and stereotypes, and the misperceptions that result. However,
only certain groups are protected.'4 ' A ban on appearance discrimination
would require employers to -disregard the way that an applicant or
employee looks, unless relevant to the position in question. Appearance
discrimination is similar to already-proscribed discrimination based on an
employee's outward appearance and the negative stereotypes associated
134. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
135. See Kara Swisher, Overweight Workers Battle Bias on the Job; Looks Discrimination Called
Common, but Hard to Prove, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1994, at Al.
136. See Rothblum et al., supra note 11, at 252-53.
137. See Barro, supra note 16, at 18.
138. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
139. Customer-preference considerations are likely to cause particular harm to the obese, who are
commonly perceived with feelings of"repulsion and disgust." Korn, supra note 6, at 64 n.248.
140. See Peter . Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature ofAntidiscrimination Law,
97 Mich. L. Rev. 564,568 (1998).
141. See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality-and the Irrational Underinclusiveness of
the Civil Rights Laws, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 52 (1988).
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with those groups.'42 Using appearance not only implicates criteria already
proscribed, it also harms an additional group similarly discriminated against
based on the way that they look and the negative associations made with
respect to their appearance. Failure to prohibit appearance discrimination
legitimizes the practice and perpetuates society's discriminatory
tendencies.'43 Consequently, prohibiting consideration of appearance in
employment actions will reinforce existing prohibitions, as well as
protect a group not yet afforded protection.
3. Appearance Discrimination Fosters Societal Inequities and
Triggers Larger Societal Problems
Pervasive and systematic discrimination in employment based on
appearance necessarily impacts individuals both socially and financially.
The findings of numerous studies support the conclusion that appearance
discrimination is common and harmful.'" Due to its prevalence, a
substantial number of otherwise qualified individuals are less likely, or
even unable, to find employment and less likely to advance and earn
equitable pay when they do secure employment.'45 Given the clear
extension of this practice beyond employment, these same individuals
may be less likely to marry, continue their education, or generally
improve their lives.'46  Discrimination in employment, therefore,
compounds the social implications of an unattractive appearance.
Because many appearance attributes will be passed on to future
generations, this cycle of discrimination and its effect will likely
continue in perpetuity.
142. See Simon J. Nadel, Discrimination: Studies Show Appearance May Influence Employers'
Decisions to Hire, Fire Workers, Emp. Pol'y & L. Daily (BNA), Apr. 5, 1999 (noting employment
attorneys' observations that appearance-based bias "often is at the heart of other types of
discrimination" and is "usually only a piece of the pie").
143. See Patzer, supra note 8, at 11.
144. See supra notes 2-3, 14, 18, 20-26, and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part L.A-B.
146. See, e.g., Susan Averett & Sanders Korenman, The Economic Reality of the Beauty Myth, 31
J. Human Resources 304, 314-18 (1996) (finding obese women have lower family incomes and
hourly wages, are less likely to be married, and have lower spousal income); Gortmaker et al., supra
note 23, at 1008 (finding overweight adolescents less likely to marry and have lower household
incomes than nonoverweight counterparts regardless of socioeconomic class or aptitude test scores);
Hamermesh & Biddle, supra note 20, at 1188-89 (finding unattractive women have lower
employment participation and marry men of lesser means).
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Appearance discrimination in employment also may disproportion-
ately affect women and their health.'47 Women are often both considered
and expected to be more attractive than men.'48 In a world where job
opportunity, advancement, and income level correlate to an attractive
appearance, but where an attractive appearance for women continues to
reach ever-more-unrealistic heights, 49 women may more directly and
frequently feel the effect of appearance discrimination in employment.5 °
Evidence suggests that obese women suffer greater economic and social
harm than do obese men."' The prevalence of frequent dieting and eating
disorders, as well as the disproportionate use of plastic surgery and other
beauty-enhancement techniques among women, illustrates the greater
pressure women face to maintain an attractive appearance.
5 2
147. The disproportionate effect on women supports an argument for a more strenuous pursuit of
these types of claims under Title VII. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
148. See Gehrke, supra note 7, at 225 (citing Jefferson B. Fletcher, The Religion of Beauty in
Women 3 (1996)); see also Etcoff, supra note 8, at 61 (noting "[mien value looks more than women
do in virtually every culture where the question has been asked" and citing studies); Hamermesh &
Biddle, supra note 20, at 1179 (noting common finding in social-psychological literature that
"women's appearances evoke stronger reactions, both positive and negative, than men's").
149. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 6, at 29-36 (describing increasingly slim ideal body type for
women and its consequences).
150. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2546-47
(arguing appearance standards for women are harder to attain, matter more, and subordinate women
to men); Klare, supra note 65, at 1414-15 (arguing existing laws reinforce gender stereotypes and
legitimize sexist understandings of gender difference and inequality). But see Patzer, supra note 8, at
7 (finding effects of physical attractiveness as being "relatively universal" for both men and women).
See generally Wolf, supra note 87, at 20-57 (arguing idea of beauty as currency has increased as
women entered workforce and achieved economic prominence and has been used to undermine
women's advancement).
151. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 6, at 32-35.
152. See Etcoff, supra note 8, at 60 (noting more women than men diet, women outnumber men
nine to one in eating disorders, and 89% of aesthetic-surgery procedures reported in one year were
performed on women); Wolf; supra note 87, at 179-217 (describing pervasive dieting and eating
disorders among women); Reena N. Glazer, Women's Body Image and the Law, 43 Duke L.J. 113,
115 (1993) (noting increasingly thin female body standard has led to obsession with body image and
low self-esteem); Kom, supra note 6, at 29-36. Interestingly, a woman's attractiveness may work
against her as she attempts to advance in a professional setting, while the same does not hold true for
men. See, e.g., Etcoff, supra note 8, at 83-85 (citing studies showing attractiveness in women can
"backfire" in workplace and noting this may happen based on stereotypes of attractive women as
being submissive, overly sexual or feminine, or due to sexual harassment by men or envy of other
women); Biddle & Hamermesh, supra note 3, at 18-20 (finding more-attractive female attorneys less
likely to achieve early partnership, while more-attractive male attorneys more likely to do so);
Gehrke, supra note 7, at 236 (citing studies showing that while attractiveness was advantage for men
seeking clerical, managerial, and professional positions, attractive female applicants were
advantaged with respect to clerical but not managerial positions, and noting attractiveness can be a
complicating factor for women in and seeking professional positions).
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B. Current Employment Discrimination Statutes Inadequately Protect
Appearance-Discrimination Victims
1. The ADA Definition of Disability Does Not Encompass the Vast
Majority ofAppearance-Discrimination Victims
The ADA definition of "disability" dilutes or eliminates the statute's
value as a method of recourse for appearance-discrimination victims. To
be protected under the ADA, individuals must actually be substantially
limited by an appearance-related impairment, have a record of such an
impairment, or be perceived as so impaired.'53 Employers will likely
consider unattractive individuals generally unappealing or undesirable,
instead of perceiving them as disabled.'54 Further, many individuals will
not likely consider themselves disabled. Individuals would also face
difficulty in proving a substantial limitation in either a class or broad
range of jobs.' 5
The ADA's failure to protect the vast majority of individuals
discriminated against on account of their weight demonstrates its
limitations. Despite the EEOC's determination that severe obesity
"clearly" qualifies as a disability,'56 both professional commentary and
court interpretation on this issue have not been uniform or clear.157 Many
courts have focused on the perceived mutability or voluntary nature of
obesity,'58 despite substantial evidence to the contrary'59 and even though
voluntary conditions are not per se excluded from ADA coverage. 6°
Even a severely obese individual still would need to show a substantial
153. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1089-90 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) (finding perception of undesirable image did not support inference that weight problem
was physical impairment, and evidence that weight was viewed as inconsistent with corporate image
did not show perceived disability).
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See EEOC, supra note 41, § 902.2(c)(5)(ii), at 902-12.
157. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Green v. Union Pac. R.P. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981). But see Cook
v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding alleged "voluntariness" of condition
irrelevant and "mutability" relevant only as to whether it had substantially limiting effect, and
irrelevant where employer regarded condition as immutable).
159. There is ample evidence suggesting weight gain or loss may be outside an individual's
control, particularly with respect to obesity. See Kom, supra note 6, at 45-51.
160. Voluntariness is irrelevant when determining whether a condition constitutes an impairment.
See EEOC, supra note 41, § 902.2(e), at 902-14. For example, lung cancer resulting from smoking
constitutes an impairment. See id.
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or perceived limitation on a major life activity. 6 ' The actual number of
individuals who would ultimately benefit by this application of the ADA
would be minute because morbid obesity is rare and obesity caused by an
underlying condition is relatively uncommon.
62
Even where an individual who suffers appearance discrimination fits
within the ADA, the chance of success may be minimal. A recent study
of reported ADA cases found that employers prevailed in ninety-two
percent of final court decisions and eighty-six percent of administrative
resolutions. 63 The more attenuated these claims are, the less likely they
are to succeed. Forcing appearance-discrimination victims to pursue their
claims under disability statutes will thus result in trivializing many
legitimate claims due to the lack of association with a traditional
disability.
2. Title VII and the ADEA Provide Only Limited Protection from
Appearance Discrimination
An appearance-related claim under Title VII or the ADEA must be
tied to an already-protected category, necessarily limiting the potential
for redress under these statutes. Essentially, a claimant must allege that
the real reason or impact of the employment action involved either race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or age, and not appearance alone. In
the case of immutable characteristics, claims under Title VII or the
ADEA may be successful where there is no legitimate defense." Yet the
allowance for differential weight requirements, as well as the
disproportionate application and effect of "attractiveness" requirements,
illustrates the limits of these suits, particularly for female and some older
claimants. 65
Mutable appearance attributes are even more problematic. For
example, beaded and braided hairstyles are disproportionately worn by
African-American women and have a long history of use and cultural
161. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
162. See Kom, supra note 6, at 43 & nn.124, 127 (noting approximately one-half of one percent
of obese individuals are morbidly obese and approximately five percent of obesity is caused by
underlying physiological disorder).
163. See John W. Parry, Executive Summary and Analysis: ADA and Other Federal Disability
Civil Rights, 22 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 282, 282 (1998).
164. See supra notes 71-78, 89-90, and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 91, 107-12, and accompanying text.
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significance. 166 Yet many courts either fail to recognize the association
between the hairstyles and racial identification or trivialize it as one of
personal preference or style, easily changed and not of particular
importance. 167 The differentiation between male and female grooming
and attire based on "generally accepted norms" essentially results in the
legal imposition of stereotypical notions concerning the appearance of
men and women. 68 In addition, because Title VII protects religion, 69 it
has no immutability requirement, yet some courts continue to minimize
the relative importance or harm resulting from discrimination based on
mutable appearance characteristics, expressly because of their
mutability.7 Finally, the fact that certain professions may legally
include attractiveness components into their appearance standards may
disproportionately impact female employees who are often held to
higher, more rigid, or more unrealistic criteria.'7 '
3. Existing Statutes Were Not Designed to Protect Against Most
Appearance Discrimination
Using the ADA to pursue appearance-discrimination claims may
dilute its strength and purpose as a remedy for conditions clearly
intended to be treated as protected disabilities. Although the ADA was
intended to protect a large and ever-growing group of individuals, 72 its
focus, intent, and purpose likely never included the plight of people who
are unattractive, overweight, or the otherwise discriminated against
because of their appearance. The filing of complaints not necessarily
intended for coverage and not neatly falling into common perceptions of
disabling conditions may increase public cynicism and jeopardize the
claims of clearly disabled individuals. 173
Similarly, other statutes were likely never intended to provide recourse
for most appearance-discrimination victims. Courts have frequently noted
166. See Rogers v. American Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also
Klare, supra note 65, at 1413-14.
167. See, e.g., Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
168. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
170. See supra notes 65, 79-83, 99-101, and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994) (describing some 43,000,000 Americans as being
disabled, with that number growing as population grows older).
173. See Margaret Carlsen, And Now, Obesity Rights, Time, Dec. 6, 1993, at 96.
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that Title VII was not meant to furnish a mechanism for employees to
dispute their employer's personal-appearance regulations. 7 4 Although the
pervasive and harmful effect of appearance discrimination should not be
minimized, a clear distinction can be made with respect to the historical
significance of those categories protected by Title VII t
C. State and Local Appearance-Discrimination Laws Are the Most
Appropriate Avenue for Relief
State and local laws offer the most hope for providing protection from
appearance discrimination. The inclusion of appearance into Title VII is
unrealistic.'76 Conventional wisdom appears adverse to a greater
expansion of protected categories at this time.'77 Therefore, the
likelihood of a specific federal statute prohibiting appearance
discrimination appears equally unrealistic. Given their more limited
scope, state and local attempts at protecting appearance-discrimination
victims provide a more likely avenue for success.'78 State and local
statutes typically provide more expansive coverage than federal laws,'79
and in many instances extend coverage to smaller employers 8' not
covered under federal laws.' State and local legislatures should thus
protect applicants and employees from appearance discrimination.
174. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,269-70 (5th Cir. 1980); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090-92 (5th Cir. 1975).
175. See, e.g., Karl V. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, 15 U. Mich.
I.L. Reform 337, 355 n.101 (1982) (arguing "a separate statute, rather than amendment of Title VII,
is warranted because the overweight have not experienced the history of purposeful, unequal
treatment that typifies those classes protected by Title VII.").
176. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Rubin, supra note 140 (discussing perception that protection from
discrimination based on certain characteristics provides "special rights").
178. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (noting
Congress did not intend Title VII to "occupy the field" to the exclusion of state laws).
179. See, e.g., Barbara Kate Repa, Your Rights in the Workplace: A Complete Guide for
Employees, 8/19 to 8/29 (3d ed. 1996) (listing categories protected under state laws, including
marital status, sickle-cell traits, political affiliation, sexual orientation, family responsibilities,
HIV/AIDS, receipt of public assistance, and arrest or conviction records).
180. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 49.60.040(3) (1998) (eight or more employees).
181. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994) (20 or more
employees); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (15 or more
employees); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (15 or more
employees).
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IV. STATE AND LOCAL LAWMAKERS SHOULD PROHIBIT
APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION
A. Appearance-Discrimination Statutes Should Protect Appearance
Characteristics, and Some Grooming and Attire
Protection should be provided for discrimination that is based on
(1) physical characteristics, (2) grooming and attire that is associated
with some already-protected category, and (3) grooming and attire that
has some other cultural or historical significance. This coverage will
incorporate all aspects of physical-appearance, as well as the vast
majority of grooming and attire claims likely to arise. Although a number
of these claims may be pursued under existing laws, this protection will
more directly and successfully address appearance discrimination. That
is, while a court may be disinclined to hold that an obese individual is
disabled or that a ban on braided hair results from or effectuates a racial
bias, protection from appearance discrimination would more squarely
confront this type of adverse employment action.
Appearance-discrimination claims should be pursued and evaluated
with the same standards used for currently protected categories.
Generally, an individual pursuing a disparate treatment claim would first
have to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.'82 For example, an
individual alleging a discriminatory nonhiring based on obesity would be
required to show a condition of obesity; application and qualification for
the job; a rejection; and that the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants, or filled the position with a
nonobese individual. 83 The employer would then be required to provide
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection."8 The plaintiff
then would be required to show that this proffered justification was mere
pretext for discriminatory intent. 8 ' A disparate impact claim generally
would entail a showing that an otherwise facially neutral employment
practice adversely impacted individuals with certain appearance
182. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
183. See id. The prima facie case would vary depending on the type of discrimination and adverse
action involved. See id. at 802 n.13.
184. See id at 802; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (confirming this requirement is limited to burden of production and ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with plaintiff).
185. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
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attributes." 6 For example, an obese individual would have to show that a
weight restriction or guideline adversely impacted obese individuals.
In an ideal world, no aspect of appearance would be considered in
employment matters. However, society may be unwilling to protect
characteristics that are clearly mutable, voluntary, and in no way
associated with some already-protected category. For instance, an
individual with tattoos, facial piercing, or green hair would not likely
engender much support as an individual in need of protection. Although
these individuals do not deserve arbitrary, irrational, and unfair
discrimination, the degree to which coverage should be provided may
more appropriately depend on the relative need for protection as well as
the significance of the appearance attribute at issue.
B. Employers Should Be Allowed to Present a Legitimate Defense for
Discriminatory Treatment Based on Appearance Characteristics
Appearance-discrimination statutes also should provide employers
with the opportunity to present a legitimate defense. Employers could
show a bfoq or business necessity for an appearance regulation or
requirement. These defenses could be construed and applied in
accordance with their interpretation and application under existing
statutes. 87 Employers could thus establish an appearance bfoq exists by
showing that a certain appearance or appearance traits are reasonably
necessary to, or within the essence of, normal business operation.'
Employers also could create policies requiring cleanliness, certain attire,
or other uniformly prescribed standards where a reasonable business
purpose or a health or safety concern exists.'89 An employer should be
required to demonstrate the existence of the standard, its uniform
application, and an objectively reasonable business purpose.' 9 As with
the ADA or religious discrimination under Title VII, employers would
need to show that a reasonable accommodation could not be provided
without undue hardship. 9' Thus, while employers would be required to
consider accommodation where possible, applicants and employees
186. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
187. See generally supra Part I for discussion of defenses existing and construed under current laws.
188. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 131 and accompanying text
191. See supra notes 35, 67, and accompanying text.
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would be advised to request reasonable accommodation when notified of
a policy inhibiting their hiring or advancement. The statute and its
defenses would likewise provide employers with an incentive to establish
and communicate clear guidelines regarding their appearance regulations
and requirements.
C. The Proposed Appearance-Discrimination Statute Withstands
Anticipated Criticisms
Obvious criticisms and concerns regarding protection for appearance
discrimination include its potential for overinclusiveness, the threat of a
flood of litigation, problems of proof, a possible extension of coverage
already provided, and the difficulty of combating an engrained and
generally accepted discriminatory practice. The protection for physical
characteristics would ostensibly protect, for example, individuals who
are left-handed, mildly overweight, or redheaded. Discrimination based
on either real or perceived attractiveness or unattractiveness may
sometimes be difficult if not impossible to assess or compare. Grooming
and attire may be considered unworthy of protection given their mutable
and voluntary nature. Furthermore, existing laws arguably already
protect grooming and attire because they would generally be tied to an
already-protected category. Many claims based on physical character-
istics, such as obesity or traits common to certain ethnic groups, could
also conceivably be pursued successfully under existing laws. Finally,
the pervasiveness of appearance discrimination in professional, social,
and personal settings may render it largely accepted as either an
appropriate or unavoidable fact of life.
Concerns of overinclusiveness, excessive litigation, and difficulty of
proof are dispelled by requiring that claimants follow existing formulas
for proving their claims. 92 If an individual or a class could not show
discriminatory treatment or impact based on appearance, they would be
unable to make out a claim of discrimination. Therefore, although
redheads could pursue a claim based on hair color, they would be
required to show that they were in fact discriminated against because of
their red hair. Because there are presumably very few occurrences of
discrimination of this kind, the likelihood of redheads, or other unlikely
appearance-discrimination victims, storming the courtrooms en masse is
an illusory concern. The fact that some of these claims could be pursued
192. See supra Part W.A.
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under existing statutes does little to refute the need for explicit
protection, given the demonstrated failure of existing statutes in
protecting many appearance-discrimination victims. 93 Finally, the fact
that appearance discrimination appears largely engrained and accepted is
an unsatisfactory and historically unsound justification for allowing a
harmful, unwarranted, and unjust practice to continue unabated, given
the fact that many currently protected categories were arguably equally
engrained and accepted at times prior to their protection. The need for
protection from appearance discrimination outweighs any concerns such
laws might create.
V. CONCLUSION
Societal tendencies to differentiate, categorize, and judge individuals
based on appearance are deeply entrenched. Yet the harms resulting from
the legitimization of appearance discrimination extend far beyond any
social implications. An individual's relative attractiveness can pro-
foundly impact employment opportunities and earning potential. Our
society has armed itself with the tools to fight arbitrary, irrational, and
unfair discrimination in employment. We should extend protection to
individuals discriminated against because of their appearance. Of course,
appearance-discrimination claims would face the same difficulties of
proof that exist with any currently protected category. However, where
individuals could show that employers have unjustly judged them based
on their appearance, they would have an opportunity to pursue a claim of
discrimination. Furthermore, employers would be both encouraged and
required to use only relevant criteria in hiring and other employment
decisions. In this respect, we would at least be one step closer to
eliminating the impulse to discriminate based on some irrelevant aspect
of an individual's identity.
193. See supra Part IILB.
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